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Introduction
Borch (1962) considered risks as commodities and explored whether each such object could be priced merely in terms of its own (marginal) distribution or moments. His …ndings were essentially negative: There can hardly exist a linear pricing regime of that sort. Moreover, even if existence were granted, price-taking exchange of risks -say, within a reinsurance market -would not in general produce Pareto e¢cient allocations. And, absent such e¢ciency, there can be no competitive equilibrium. In conclusion Borch (op. cit.) suggested that risk exchange had better be analyzed as a cooperative game.
This paper picks up that suggestion. By reconsidering Borch's approach I am led to analyze a transferable-utility cooperative game, featuring agents who …nd it worthwhile to pool their risks. Given some degree of independence among various risks, their pooling smoothens nature's vagaries: Lucky agents can help unlucky ones; ups somewhere can mitigate downs elsewhere. Given also risk aversion on each part, the advantages (individual and social) of pooling su¢ce, as shown here, to render the core non-empty.
Last but not least important, a core solution can then be computed and implemented by means of a linear price regime. That regime depends on the entire preference pro…le and the aggregate risk -and only on those items. As in competitive equilibrium, individual preferences can be aggregated into those of a single representative …gure, here called the convoluted agent. As in …nance, the premium (the trading price) of any insurance treaty is largely a¤ected by how its indemnity co-varies with the aggregate risk.
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The main novelties of this paper come with risk exchange being viewed not as a competitive economy but rather -and more conveniently -as a cooperative game with side payments. Not surprisingly, the game in question assumes the form of a mutual insurance company. Formally, it …ts inside the frames of concave optimization with attending advantages for computation and interpretation. Further, the setup proposed here invites modelling of trade as repeated, direct exchanges between two new parties each time. These bilateral transactions could proceed by means of predesigned contracts, such instruments here being called insurance treaties. Finally, but more on a technical note, there is tolerance for non-smooth payo¤s and room for restrictions on exchange.
Cooperative Risk Sharing
Ex ante, in face of uncertainty, all concerned parties agree that one and only one state s 2 S can come about next period. Thus S is an exhaustive list of mutually exclusive and economically relevant states. For analytical simplicity take S to be …nite. 1 For generality, however, it seems prudent to avoid hypotheses about common or subjective beliefs the likelihood of various outcomes. Thus probabilities and expected values will not be mentioned before next section.
Accommodated henceforth is a …xed and …nite set I of individual parties. Agent
s being his claim (indemnity or dividend) in state s. One may naturally posit that ¹ y i s be a real number, referring to money or units of account. Nothing prevents us though, from specifying this item as a vector in some …xed Euclidean space E.
2
The advantage of this option is that ¹ y i s can be construed as a fully speci…ed bundle of various commodities to be delivered in state s. So, whether one sees E as the real Euclidean line or as a higher dimensional space, it is -in either case -natural to call s 7 ! ¹ y An important hypothesis is now in order: Speaking of payo¤ (instead of utility) it presumably is cardinal and transferable among agents. Consequently, any coalition C of agents -that is, any nonempty community C µ I -could pool their claims and 1 The subsequent arguments can accommodate an in…nite measure space S together with a Hilbert space Y of square-integrable pro…les y 2 E S : Of particular theoretical interest are non-atomic measure spaces; see [1] , [11] . 2 In fact, any topological vector space E would do provided it be locally convex and Hausdor¤. One can construe ¹ y i as a consumption pro…le to which agent i is entitled. This viewpoint …ts to …nance, and it opens up for a dynamic perspective. 3 The particular instance Y = Y is later referred to as complete.
undertake transfers among themselves. Motivation for such an enterprise stems from the fact that C may, at least in principle, ensure itself an aggregate payo¤
Clearly, (1) models pooling and friction-free redistribution of perfectly divisible risks, ¹ y C being the total claim held by coalition C: To induce participation of everybody in a large, common pool -that is, to stimulate formation of the grand coalition C = I -one need a viable scheme for payo¤ sharing. For its acceptance a proposed scheme had better be e¢cient, incentive compatible, and "equitable". Any core imputation …lls that bill. This solution concept, most popular in cooperative game theory, amounts here to specify a compensation schedule c = (c i ) 2 R I which supports
Pareto e¢ciency:
and ensures no blocking:
Is such a scheme c of side payments available? Can a core solution c be exhibited, computed and interpreted? Yes, if agents are risk averse, indeed it can! The argument goes in terms of "price regimes" and standard Lagrangians. To introduce and conveniently handle these objects, equip the space Y with a …xed inner product denoted simply by juxtaposition y 0 y of the two vectors. Modulo that product Y permits a decomposition Y © N into the direct sum of two orthogonal spaces; N being the normal complement to the given subspace Y:
Correspondingly, let the dual space Y ¤ ; which comprises all continuous linear functionals on Y (and no more), be decomposed orthogonally as a corresponding direct sum
This means that any element in Y ¤ comes a unique sum y ¤ + n ¤ such that (y ¤ + n ¤ )(y + n) = y ¤ y + n ¤ n: Note that each n ¤ 2 N ¤ := Y ? ; when considered as a price, renders all bundles in Y freely available. In geometrical terms, n ¤ 2 N ¤ i¤ it stands "orthogonally" (normally) onto Y , this meaning that
it is expedient to consider their customary convex conjugates:
After these preparations associate to problem (1) the Lagrangian
Declare now the pair (y
Theorem 1. (Shadow prices on risks generate core solutions) For any shadow price regime (y ¤ ; n ¤ ) the payment scheme
belongs to the core. That is, it satis…es (2).
Proof. For each coalition C and any dual pair (y
Thus, invoking de…nition (5), the "no blocking constraints" in (2) are all easily satis…ed. But Pareto e¢ciency follows straightforwardly as well because
The left inequality was assumed in (4), and the right one derives for the instance C = I from (6). 2
The competitive nature -and the decentralizing impact -of a shadow price regime is speaking: If o¤ered additional payment y ¤ (y i ¡ ¹ y i ) + n i¤ n i for replacing ¹ y i + 0 by y i + n i ; agent i would make a choice that perfectly …ts problem (1) when C = I: Theorem 1 says that (y ¤ ; n ¤ ) is a shadow price regime i¤ it realizes the saddle value min sup L I = sup inf L I : Put di¤erently: what comes into play is a lop-sided min-max result. But existence of saddle points/values cannot generally be guaranteed unless some versions of compactness, continuity, and convexity are in vigor. Ignoring compactness for a while, we are -as usual in microeconomics -left with concerns about continuity and convexity of preferences. To get away from these, simply assume that all payo¤s
So, in particular, each agent is risk averse. To appreciate the concavity assumption -and to understand the nature of shadow price regimes -consider a representative agent, here called the convoluted agent, who enjoys payo¤
The two arguments which a¤ect that synthetic or …ctive fellow are …rst, an aggregate risk y I 2 Y; and second, a pro…le n = (n i ) of vectors normal to Y . Clearly, ¼ I (y I ; n) equals the payo¤ that would accrue to the grand coalition I if allowed to replace ¹ y I by y I and, at the same time, o¤er each member i a normal component n i : The bivariate function ¼ I (¢; ¢) thus de…ned inherits concavity from the terms ¼ i : Consequently, the convoluted agent is risk averse as well. Note, after having accepted apologies for slight abuse of notation, that
where the latter (right hand) value already was de…ned in (2) .
Compactness was brie ‡y mentioned here above to ensure existence of a shadow price regime. It turns out that if
then that concern is taken care of. In fact, quali…cation (7) yields a "neo-classical", marginalistic interpretation of shadow prices. For the statement recall that
On such occasions one writes g 2 @f (y): The following result derives now directly from convex analysis [7] , [9] : Proposition 1. (Existence and characterization of shadow price regimes) ² Under quali…cation (7) there exists a super-gradient (y ¤ ; n ¤ ) 2 @¼ I (¹ y I ; 0); and each such item constitutes a shadow price regime. ² Conversely, any shadow price regime (y ¤ ; n ¤ ) must be a supergradient for the convoluted agent ¼ I (¢; ¢) at (¹ y I ; 0): ² In sum, a shadow price regime (y ¤ ; n ¤ ) -and a corresponding core solution (5) can be de…ned -i¤
is a shadow price regime, and (y i ) solves problem (2) for the grand coalition, it holds for each i that
Inclusions (8) That is, up to idiosyncratic normal components n i¤ ; i 2 I; they agree on one price in Y . This re ‡ects that in the "market game " [10] , restricted to Y; all desirable exchanges have been made. An infeasible exchange, one whose normal component n does not vanish, may very well yield valuations n i¤ n which vary across agents. If however, potential exchanges constitute a complete space, that is, if Y = Y; then clearly, n ¤ = 0; and things become simpler. In that instance y ¤ is brie ‡y named a shadow price. 
stemming from a bivariate proper, concave objective1 i (¢; ¢) de…ned over a Euclidean vector space X i £Y. Coalition C µ I could then achieve
Let here L C (x; y; n; y ¤ ; n 
for some price regime (y ¤ ; n ¤ ). Then, by o¤ering agent i compensation c i := f i¤ (0; y ¤ + n i¤ ) ¡ y ¤ ¹ y i ; we get a core solution. 2
Common Predictions and Separable Preferences
Assume in addition here that everybody holds the same opinion about the likelihood of various outcomes s 2 S. Formally, there is a common probability distribution p = (p s ) over S; the numbers p s being strictly positive with sum 1. Each linear functional on Y = E S can now be represented in terms of the statistically motivated, probabilistic inner product y 0 y := P s2S p s y 0 s y s . Such representation is particularly useful for the important instance where preferences are of von Neumann-Morgenstern separable type. Then ex ante payo¤
equals the expected value of its ex post state-dependent counterpart, and (8) amounts to have y ¤ s + n i¤ s 2 @¼ i s (y i s ) for each s: Given such separable format (10) , if coalition C undertook pooling ex post, after s has been unveiled, it would there obtain over-all payo¤
Thus one may speak about contingent, state-dependent cooperation, implemented after the fact. Like above, a compensation scheme c s = (c Opportunistic behavior of this sort -where agents prefer to wait and see -will, when feasible, not generally …t with (2) . The simple reason is, of course, that in passing from (2) to (11) 
And it does not matter whether these cooperative treaties were written before or after the state has been unveiled. 2
Bilateral Exchange of Risks
Construction (1) invites some pressing questions. Namely, when C = I; who undertakes the optimization -and how? Further, since e¢cient solution requires revelation of true preferences, can the solution procedure -or at least the outcome -be implemented? May either fall victim to strategic communication?
I shall divorce these issues and address …rst how a center or a consultant, who holds all necessary information, might take up the computational task. Suppose henceforth that problem (1) has at least one optimal solution for C = I: Denote by P Y the orthogonal projection of vectors in Y onto the subspace Y: Let f°kg be a numerical sequence of so-called step sizes, selected a priori subject to°k¸0 
² Move to next stage k Ã k + 1 with new step size°Ã°k: ² Continue to Select until convergence. 2
Proposition 3
The described procedure of iterated gradient projection converges to an optimal of problem (1) for the grand coalition.
Proof. Given y i 2 Y for all i 2 I ; and also
Thus (12) is the method of (super) gradient projection applied to the separable objective P i2I ¼(y i ): Convergence now follows from received theory; see [5] . 2 After convergence to an optimal pro…le (y i ), pick a common y ¤ 2 \ i2I P Y [@¼ i (y i )] ; and for each agent i; a normal n i¤ 2 @¼ i (y i ) ¡ y ¤ which satis…es (8) . In particular, if each payo¤
For greater realism the centralized projection algorithm, just described, had better be replaced by an iterative, non-coordinated procedure driven by the agents themselves. Next I outline one possible avenue along which they could travel. It involves repeated bilateral exchanges of risk and goes as follows: Proof. Let the set -consist of all unordered pairs fi; i 0 g of distinct agents i; i 0 2 I: The event ! = fi; i 0 g means that agents i; i 0 are o¤ered the opportunity to trade between themselves. Quite naturally, such o¤ers should be egalitarian. So, endowwith the uniform probability measure; that is, each unordered pair is selected with equal probability Pr := 2= [jIj (jIj ¡ 1)] where jIj is the number of agents.
For every ! = fi; i 0 g 2 -and bundle y = (
: Let E stand for expectation taken with respect to !; using the uniform probability Pr : Note that E¼(!; y) = 2 Pr
Thus, in problem (1), for the case C = I one may equally well maximize the objective E¼(!; y); and so will be done here.
The modi…ed but equivalent objective E¼(!; y) invites use of stochastic gradient techniques [5] . To see precisely how, it is convenient for any m is nothing else than (13). Convergence now follows from an appeal to known results; see [5] . 2
Trade of Insurance Treaties
It is time to justify why only risks residing in a subspace Y ½ Y are traded. Clearly, if any exchange in Y were possible, we would be in the standard setting of a barter economy.
For a modi…ed and more realistic setting, one which better …ts and justi…es the existence of insurance (as well as …nance), suppose exchange is mediated only via a …nite set J of so-called instruments, brie ‡y named insurance treaties. By such a treaty j 2 J is here understood a contract that promises to pay its holder a speci…ed indemnity (coverage or dividend) d sj if state s 2 S comes about. Suppose treaties are perfectly divisible, traded with no quantity restrictions and victims to no transaction costs.
As customary, for the sake of simple exposition, only two time periods are considered, namely: now and next period. In other words: all treaties expire after one appropriately de…ned time step. Suppose now that agent i already holds portfolio ¹ x i ; generating risk ¹ y i := D ¹ x i : Coalition C can achieve 
Clearly, i could have access to a particular set J i (e i ; y i ), coalition C gets reduced payo¤
When however, only agent i knows e i or E i (¢), there are problems (with hidden actions or types), these making the prospects for e¢cient cooperation appear less good.
